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ABSTRACT. This paper looks at an important but understudied indicator of party change – the turnover of 
electoral candidates. We analyse 170,000 candidates in 55 elections in Central and Eastern Europe – a region with 
volatile political parties and party systems. We develop a measure of weighted candidate novelty (WCN) that 
takes into account the list placement of candidates and party size. There are significant differences in the levels of 
WCN between countries but at best limited evidence of more stability over time. In the second part of the paper, 
we contrast the findings on electoral candidate turnover to volatility scores used in previous studies. WCN is 
correlated to electoral volatility, but there are significant outliers. We contend that these are produced by parties 
that are: (a) new, but only moderately novel in terms of candidates, (b) old but have experienced significant 
internal change, resulting in high candidate turnover, and (c) neither genuinely old nor genuinely new. The last 
category of partially novel parties poses most problems for indices of party system change that assume parties 
that are either stationary or perfectly new. 
How unstable are political parties and party systems? The most widely used indicator of 
party system change is the Pedersen’s electoral volatility index, as it is intuitive and easy to 
calculate.1 However, it was much easier to apply in Pedersen’s early work on West European 
party systems characterized by high levels of organizational continuity among parties than it 
has been in the last couple of decades – particularly in new democracies that have seen very 
high degrees of organizational innovation among political parties. Perhaps the most 
important problem facing investigators when calculating volatility in Central and Eastern 
Europe (CEE, the region that we focus on in this paper) is that calculation of volatility has 
nearly always been based on dichotomously distinguishing between new and old parties 
and, in case of splits and mergers, identifying a singular successor or predecessor. This paper 
is primarily motivated by our desire to explore levels of novelty within parties using an 
interval scale – an approach that would allow for a more nuanced and adequate approach to 
the calculation of volatility that takes into account patterns of novelty and continuation 
                                                 
* The research for this paper has been partly been funded by the EU’s FP7 ANTICORRP project. This research was 
earlier presented at the workshop “Party System Stability and Electoral Volatility: Its Measurement and 
Implications.” 26-27 February 2015, University of Nottingham. We thank Ingrid van Biezen, Lori Thorlakson, 
Nicholas Sauger and other workshop participants for helpful comments. Here, we have used an improved method 
of candidate matching between pairs of elections and introduced weighted candidate novelty based on sigmoid 
function. 
1 Pedersen 1979, for applications see Drummond 2006; Lane and Ersson 2007; S. Mainwaring and Zoco 2007; 
Scott Mainwaring, España, and Gervasoni 2009; Powell and Tucker 2014; Roberts and Wibbels 1999; Sikk 2005; 
Tavits 2005, 2008. Still, it does suffer from problems – particularly as it does not necessarily reflect individual level 
changes, even if it seems to aggregate them (see Dejaeghere and Dassonneville n.d.).  
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among parties (outlined in Sikk and Köker 2015). Party novelty has several dimensions – 
including splits, mergers, leadership, names, programmatic profiles etc – but in this paper we 
focus on perhaps the most neglected aspect of electoral candidate change.2 
We start our analysis of candidate novelty and the related phenomenon of candidate 
dropout by looking at overall trends over time in individual countries. The region has 
experienced varying and on the aggregate there has at best been a mild overall trend of 
declining candidate turnover. The second section of this paper explores the relationship 
between levels of candidate novelty/dropout and electoral volatility – specifically by 
comparing our indices to the volatility scores calculated by Powell and Tucker (2014). We 
discover a clear relationship between the two and find that novelty could be more clearly 
linked to suggested determinants of party system change (e.g. economic growth) than 
volatility. For some elections, we find a high discrepancy between novelty and volatility 
measures that, we believe, is related to debatable coding decisions relating to new parties 
and, more generally, to the impossibility of “correctly” coding parties dichotomously as new 
and old. 
In the final section, we look in more detail at candidate novelty in individual parties. We 
discover that two groups of large parties – genuinely new parties and established parties – 
can be distinguished easily based on candidate novelty. However, problems are posed by 
electoral coalitions and partially novel parties. Electoral coalitions – which are common and 
often very successful in CEE – often have low levels of candidate novelty, yet have not always 
been linked to predecessors in volatility calculations.3 Partially novel parties present even 
more problems. On the one hand, they are genuinely novel (e.g. in terms of leadership or 
name) yet, on the other hand, may field many candidates who have previously run on other 
parties’ tickets. Once again, it is impossible to dichotomously "correctly" code such electons 
– to use a joint name for party lists and electoral coalitions (proposed in Sikk and Köker 
2015a). However, given their often high levels of success, such coding decisions can lead to 
very different estimates of party system change. We finish the paper with a discussion of 
broader implications of our research on the study of political parties and party change. 
Candidate turnover in CEE 
Out analysis is based on a dataset of over 170,000 electoral candidates in 55 elections CEE 
elections between 1993 and 2014. Most of the data has been collected from public sources, 
primarily those available online. The dataset includes all current EU member states from the 
region, excluding Croatia and Romania, for which data has been more difficult to analyse or 
obtain, respectively.4 Table 1 shows an overview of the data. 
                                                 
2 Recent studies that problematize the dichotomous notion of party novelty either do not look at candidates 
(Litton 2013) or do so only in the passing (Barnea and Rahat 2011). 
3 In some cases, such coalitions draw candidates from several previously existing parties yet are linked to a 
singular predecessor in volatility calculations. 
4 We plan to include these as well as some of the missing earlier elections in future. 
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Table 1 Elections included in the study 
Election number BG CZ EE HU LT LV PL SI SK 
1   1992 1990   1991   
2   1995 1994 1996 1995 1993   
3 1994* 1996 1999 1998 2000 1998 1997  1994 
4 1997* 1998 2003 2002 2004 2002 2001  1998 
5 2001 2002 2007 2006 2008 2006 2005 2004 2002 
6 2005 2006 2011 2010 2012 2010 2007 2008 2006 
7 2009 2010  2014  2011 2011 2011 2010 
8 2013 2013    2014  2014 2012 
9 2014         
* Only data for parties which entered parliament. 
Using an elaborate R script, we matched candidates in an election with those in previous 
election using names and, where impossible due to duplicate names using party labels, party 
codes in MRG dataset (Volkens et al. 2014) and information about the movement of other 
candidates between parties, assuming that an unmatched candidate is more likely to have 
followed others rather than gone their own way.5 We checked the accuracy of these matches 
in a small number of cases and it provides reasonably robust results with no more than 1-3 
percent of incorrect codings – certainly not worse than typical levels of mis-reporting and 
data entry errors in survey data.  
Most of the candidates represent small and hence insignificant parties. Likewise, top ranking 
candidates are obviously more important than those lower down the list as they stand a 
better chance of being elected and are also more visible to the voters – particularly in open 
list systems used in most elections under study. Therefore, in the initial analysis we only 
include parties that won at least five percent of the vote and focus in on top 25 percent of 
the candidates in electoral districts (national lists in Estonia, Lithuania and Hungary 2014).6 
Figure 1 shows that candidate novelty has generally not decreased across the region. Only 
Bulgaria, Estonia and Lithuania have maintained a solid decreasing trend in the last three 
elections under study, with respectively 32, 29 and 20 percent of new candidates in the last 
election. On the other hand, some countries have seen marked increases in novelty (e.g. the 
Czech Republic) or retain high levels of candidate novelty (e.g. Slovenia). The trend across 
the region has been mildly decreasing at best. Still, the most notable feature of Figure 1 are 
the significant fluctuations in candidate novelty. This is usually caused by breakthroughs of 
genuinely new parties that bring in more new candidates than established parties (see 
                                                 
5 We also checked for "fuzzy" matches between names that allows for minor spelling mistakes and identified 
some candidates who might have changed surnames (usually after marriage). Hence, we manually coded a small 
number of high-ranking candidates from major parties to improve the accuracy of our novelty and drop-out 
scores. 
6 In some elections (particularly in Estonia 1995), some parties ran oversized lists, with the number of candidates 
more than twice the number of seats in the parliament. To correct for such situations, top 25 percent and “full 
lists” are defined by district magnitude (i.e. 0.25M and M, respectively), or total number of seats, where national 
lists were used. 
4 
 
below). The other reason for some downward spikes is pre-term elections – such as those in 
Poland 2007, Latvia 2011, Slovakia 2012 and Bulgaria 2014.  
Figure 1 Candidate novelty by countries 
Data: bit.ly/SKECPRGCF1 
Note: top 25% of candidates, parties with at least 5% of votes. Black solid line shows lowess trend. 
A mentioned above, all parties are not equal and not all candidates are equal. Candidates of 
a party that wins 35 percent of seats should have a stronger impact on aggregate candidate 
novelty than candidates of a party with five percent of support, let alone one with 0.1 
percent. Furthermore, the importance of candidates at list positions varies between parties. 
For example, imagine two candidates ranked 25 out of 100 (i.e. just included makes in top 25 
percent). If one of the parties is likely to win 30 of the mandates and the other one only 4 
mandates, the candidate of the bigger party has a real chance of winning a seat and is 
obviously more significant than the candidate of the smaller party who is bound to be an 
also-run. Hence, our initial threshold of 25 percent needs to be adjusted by party support.  
An alternative approach to adopting strict cut-off points is weighting candidates so that 
those at the top contribute more and those at the bottom less to the index of candidate 
novelty.7 A negative linear progression of weights – e.g. (1, 0.75, 0.5, 0.25, 0) for M=5 – would 
be most straightforward. However, this gives too much weight to all low-ranking candidates 
bar the last very one. 
Weights that follow a logistic or sigmoid function are more appropriate, as they allow for 
small decline in the weights at the top, a more significant drop in candidate importance in 
the middle and smooth dying off at the end. The weights are based on the well-known 
formula of the sigmoid function: 
 𝑓(𝑥) =
𝐿
1+𝑒−𝑘(𝑥−𝑥0)
 (1) 
where x0 is the sigmoid's mid-point, L the maximum value and k the steepness of the curve. 
For weighted candidate novelty (WCN) we modify the formula: 
                                                 
7 We disregard candidates with list placements in excess of M. 
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 the values of original logistic equation range from 0 to 1, but as the weights must run 
from 1 to 0, we subtract the equation from 1 and set L at 1; 
 x0 varies between parties so that the midpoint is always at the party's total vote share 
– e.g. at the 25 percent list position for a party that won 25 percent of votes;8 
 K is set at 0.25 as this produces a curve with suitable smoothness; 
 the weights for a party in each district must to add up to 1 – therefore, we divide the 
weighted value for a candidate with a rank of x by the sum of initial weights for all 
candidates 
Thus, we can calculate the weighted candidate novelty (WCN) of party p in district d: 
 𝑊𝐶𝑁 𝑝,𝑑 = ∑  𝑁𝐸𝑊 ⋅  
1−
1
1+𝑒
−25(𝑟−𝑣𝑝)
∑ 1−
1
1+𝑒
−25(𝑟−𝑣𝑝)
 (2) 
where NEW is a dummy for candidates who did not run in previous election and r the relative 
list position of a candidate r = (rank – 1)/(M – 1).9 Figure 2 illustrates the standardized 
weights for candidates. It shows that for largest parties, more candidates have substantial 
weight as more stand a reasonable chance of winning a seat. The smaller the party, the 
higher the weight of the candidates at the top of the list as few others stand a reasonable 
chance of winning a seat. We assume that when fielding candidates, parties have some 
information about the likely number of seats they are going to win and we use the actual 
share of votes as a proxy for that.10  
Figure 2 Weights for candidates for selected parties 
 
Notes: Relative list placement = (rank – 1)/(M – 1). Note that areas under all curves add up to 1 that is the total of 
candidate weights in a district. 
                                                 
8 We use the national vote share as our dataset currently does not hold information about constituency level 
support for parties. 
9 I.e. for fourth ranked candidate under M=10, r = (4-1)/(10-1) = 3/9 = 0.33. The calculations were implemented in 
R using the sigmoid function in pracma package.  
10 We also considered weights based on a logarithmic function of candidate's distance from the bottom of the list 
(so that the top candidate has the highest weight, e.g. 1, 0.95, 0.90, 0.85, 0.78, 0.70) and based on declining in 
geometric progression (e.g. 1, 1/2, 1/4, 1/16 etc). However, the first gives too much weight to very low ranking 
candidates and the second introduces excessive gaps between top candidates if the tails of lists were to have very 
small weights. 
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The novelty scores by district parties can be added up across the country, but need to be 
weighted by the size of districts relative to the total number of seats in all districts:11 
 𝑊𝐶𝑁 𝑝 =  ∑
𝑀
∑ 𝑀
𝑊𝐶𝑁𝑝,𝑑  (3) 
Finally, the aggregate weighted candidate novelty in an election is calculated by adding 
together the party scores, weighted by their vote shares (vp): 
 𝑊𝐶𝑁 =  ∑ 𝑣𝑝 ∑
𝑀
∑ 𝑀
𝑊𝐶𝑁𝑝,𝑑 (4) 
All of the formulas can be easily interpreted as they range from 0 (no new candidates) to 1 
(all candidates are new).  
Figure 3 Weighted candidate novelty by countries 
 Data: bit.ly/SKECPRGCF3 
Note: The fine black line show loess trend. 
Figure 3 shows the weighted candidate novelty scores for the elections under study. On 
average, the scores are fairly similar to those in Figure 1 (top candidates of parties above five 
percent of the vote). However, there are some interesting differences. Firstly, elections with 
highly successful genuinely new parties – Bulgaria 2000, 2009, Latvia 1998, 2002, Slovakia 
2002 and Slovenia 2014 – are much more visible. Secondly, the slight trend towards lower 
candidate novelty in Figure 1 all but disappears.12  
Figure 4 shows the extent of candidate novelty among established parties – defined here as 
those who did not run in the preceding election in the Manifesto Project dataset (Volkens et 
al. 2014).13 The levels of candidate novelty are, unsurprisingly, lower for established parties 
                                                 
11 Total number of seats in the parliament (S) would be more straightforward, but in multi-tier systems we only 
look at one of the tiers. 
12 The higher novelty in early 1990s in Figure 1 was caused by more new candidates among top 25 percent in 
parties that won less than 25 percent of the vote. 
13 The following parties (mostly coalitions or parties after the break-up of coalitions) had a novel code in Volkens 
et al 2014, but were manually coded as old,: DL (BG 1997), ODS (BG 1997), KZB (BG 2001), KZB (BG 2013), IL (EE 
1999), BSDA (LT 2000), UdL (LT 2004), TS-LKD (LT 2008), DP (LT 2012), PCTVL (LV 2002), AWS (PL 1997), SLD-UP 
(PL 2001), SDK (SK 1998), SDKU (SK 2002). 
7 
 
than all parties. In all elections, weighted candidate novelty score remained below 0.5 and 
was below 0.3 in most cases. Hence, parties that already contested the previous election, 
typically list fewer than 30 percent of "significant" candidates. The largest differences 
between overall weighted candidate novelty and that among established parties in elections 
with remarkable new party breakthroughs (LT 2000, 2004; BG 2001, 2009; SI 2014; EE 2003; 
LV 2002; CZ 2010; see Appendix 1 for detail on individual parties). We find a slightly clearer 
negative trend, with average candidate novelty among established parties decreasing from 
around 50 percent in early 1990s to around 30 percent in the most recent elections. 
Established party candidate novelty has generally decreased or remained low in some 
countries – particularly in Estonia, Hungary and Lithuania where in the last three elections 
only one in four candidates did not run in previous election. However, the trend is far from 
uniform and some countries have experienced high or increasing candidate novelty even 
among established parties. 
Figure 4 Weighted candidate novelty by countries (established parties only) 
 Data: bit.ly/SKECPRGCF4 
Note: Only parties that were not coded as new in Volkens et al. 2014. The black line show loess trend. 
Figure 5 Weighted candidate dropout by countries 
 Data: bit.ly/SKECPRGCF5 
Note: For consistency with novelty scores, the horizontal axis shows years when the candidates that ran in the 
previous election dropped out. The black line show loess trend. 
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Finally, weighted candidate dropout levels – i.e. the share of candidates in previous election 
that did not contest the more recent one – follow broadly similar trends. There are, however, 
interesting individual parties which have shown remarkable degrees of candidate dropouts 
that has not always been matched by candidate novelty (see Appendix 2 for detail on 
individual parties). The two can diverge as the weights assigned to particular candidates can 
be different in two subsequent elections if their list placement changes. It is hypothetically 
possible that all high-ranking candidates drop out in the next election (e.g. because of 
scandals) but are replaced by candidates who had been lower down the list in the previous 
election. 
Candidate turnover and volatility 
What is the relationship between candidate change and electoral change? As noted above, 
candidate novelty has been particularly high in elections with very successful genuinely new 
parties. Also, established political parties tend to have a significantly lower candidate novelty 
than new political parties. Hence, we would expect some, although imperfect relationship 
between candidate and electoral change (as measured by volatility).14 
Figure 6 Total volatility and weighted candidate novelty  
 Data: bit.ly/SKECPRGCF6 
Note: Black line for equality of WCN and total volatility. Source: Total volatility from Powell & Tucker (2013) 
As expected, the overall candidate novelty is positively correlated to volatility (based on data 
from Powell and Tucker 2014, see Figure 6). However, the relationship is far from perfect. 
Notably, some countries seem to have consistently higher than expected levels of volatility 
(Lithuania) compared to candidate novelty, while others have consistently relatively lower 
levels of volatility (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary). This might be related to cross-
country variation in the levels of typical candidate novelty, but is more likely to be the result 
                                                 
14 We should not expect the relationship to be perfect as volatility has two sources: (a) voters moving from old 
(and disappeared) parties to new parties and (b) voters moving between existing political parties (see Powell and 
Tucker 2014). 
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of coding decisions regarding new parties, coalitions and mergers.15 Electon continuity might 
be more accurately taken into account when calculating the volatility index in the countries 
with lower than expected volatility, while major coalitions or partially novel electons might 
have been coded as new in Lithuania (see discussion on partially novel electons and 
Lithuania below). 
To what extent is candidate replacement related to new party entry and old party exit? 
Figure 7 shows the relationship between the mean of candidate novelty and dropout, and 
Type A volatility – i.e. volatility caused by the entry and exit of parties form the political 
system (Powell and Tucker 2014, 124). The relationship is surprisingly weak. Some of the 
cases emphasize that the extent of political elite turnover may not always be fully reflected in 
Type A volatility. The 1997 election in Bulgaria and 2005 election Poland saw many new 
candidates join and many old candidates leave tops of party lists, yet this is not fully 
reflected in the Type A volatility scores. Both elections were characterized by the collapse of 
parties that had been the overwhelming winners of the previous election (Democratic Left in 
both countries). However, as the parties retained representation in the parliament, Type A 
volatility score was only average.  
Type A volatility for Lithuania 2004 is strikingly high given the medium candidate turnover 
(see Figure 8 and Figure 9 for details on individual parties). The election did see 
breakthroughs of an important new electons: (a) the genuinely new Labour Party (DP), the 
newness of which is corroborated by candidate novelty data (WCN = 0.91), (b) two partially 
new formations, “For Order & Justice” (UTT) of the impeached president Rolandas Paksas 
(WCN = 0.44) and Liberal & Centre Union (LICS, WCN = 0.49). Two major parties also 
disappeared: the Liberal Union (LLS) and the New Union (NS). However, their candidate 
dropout was rather low at 0.27 and 0.38, respectively – fairly typical level for established 
parties. Most of their candidates found a place on the lists of one of the new parties or the 
Working for Lithuania (UdL, in fact a coalition of Social Democratic Party and New Union). 
UdL had the lowest level of candidate novelty (0.16) among main parties,16 but is coded as a 
new electon in Powell & Tucker dataset. Coding elections with that extent of party 
transformation is extremely challenging and actually impossible to do “correctly” using a 
dichotomous scheme (more detailed discussion below). 
                                                 
15 The first argument is undermined by the fact that Hungary and Lithuania are both countries with low aggregate 
and old parties' WCN. 
16 Tied with Homeland Union (TS), to be more precise. 
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Figure 7 Type A (exit/entry) volatility, and mean of candidate novelty & dropout 
 Data: bit.ly/SKECPRGCF7 
Note: Black line for candidate turnover = Type A volatility. Source: volatility from Powell & Tucker (2013) 
Figure 8 Weighted candidate novelty by parties, Lithuania (V > 10%) 
 
Note: label size shows party size. 
Figure 9 Weighted candidate dropout by parties, Lithuania (V > 10%) 
 
Note: Label size shows party size. For consistency with novelty scores, the horizontal axis shows years when the 
candidates that ran in the previous election dropped out. 
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Type B volatility (i.e. volatility between existing parties) and candidate novelty among 
established parties (Figure 10) are again correlated mildly. There seems to be a general trend 
that increased candidate novelty leads to increased volatility or, alternatively, existing parties 
rejuvenate their candidate lists if they anticipate changes in electoral support. In particular, 
parties that are expected to do poorly may recruit new top candidate, possibly to replace 
former dignitaries that have left party politics anticipating downfall. However, volatility can 
obviously come about for different reasons than internal candidate change and rejuvenation 
of electoral lists can turn the waning tide for parties in decline.  
Figure 10 Type B volatility and candidate novelty among established parties 
 Data: bit.ly/SKECPRGCF10 
Note: Black line for OLS fit between WCN and Type B volatility. Source: total volatility from Powell & Tucker (2013) 
Powell & Tucker (2014, 126) argued in a conclusion to their study of volatility in Eastern 
Europe that " know little about what causes swings in votes between existing political 
parties". Replication of the fully specified regression models (using elections included in 
Powell & Tucker and our datasets) returns no statistically significant coefficients. However, it 
is notable that a much simpler model that includes GDP change from previous election17 
alongside country fixed effects (see Table 2) shows that improvement in economic conditions 
does lead to increased total volatility and lower candidate turnover. The effect on novelty is 
robust both among established and all parties with a sluggish 10 percent growth over an 
electoral term leading to 3 percent fewer new candidates among established parties or 25 
percent growth (median in cases included) to almost 8 percent fewer new candidates. 
Hungary and the Czech Republic tend to have lower than average levels of candidate novelty 
that is in line with literature arguing early consolidation of these two party systems, but has 
been challenged by recent high levels of candidate novelty. (Powell & Tucker data finishes 
with 2009).18 Admittedly, our range of variables is very limited and not all elections are 
included in the analysis, but the results are essentially encouraging. To paraphrase Powell & 
                                                 
17 GDP change was one of the variables that Powell & Tucker identified as having a statistically significant impact 
on volatility. However, it has been since shown that the effect was an artefact solely resulting from lack of quality 
data for Bosnia & Herzegovina (Crabtree and Golder 2015). 
18 Note that the model fit and magnitude of GDP's effect is higher when WCN is used – in earlier models looking 
at top 25% of lists among parties with at least 5 percent of votes only had slightly poorer fits.  
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Tucker – we know little about determinants of candidate change, but with can argue with 
some confidence that GDP change does have an impact.19 There is evidence that West 
European voters increasingly respond to economic downturns by switching parties 
(Dassonneville and Hooghe 2015) and at the very least we have evidence that electoral 
politics is not completely insensitive to that in CEE either. 
Table 2 Effect of GDP change on volatility, candidate novelty and dropout 
 
Volatility    Candidate novelty  
Total Type A Type B  All parties Established parties Candidate dropout 
(Intercept) 79.81 (18.51)*** 50.12 (24.36)* 29.69 (11.66)**  91.30 (13.93)*** 75.20 (9.98)*** 65.11 (8.98)*** 
GDPt/GDPt-1 -27.53 (15.07)* -18.85 (19.82) -8.68 (9.49)  -29.91 (11.34)** -28.57 (8.12)*** -13.27 (7.31)* 
CZ -31.13 (9.69)*** -21.41 (12.75) -9.73 (6.10)  -27.59 (7.29)*** -17.11 (5.23)*** -17.15 (4.70)*** 
EE 1.11 (9.04) 3.06 (11.90) -1.95 (5.69)  -18.96 (6.81)** -15.51 (4.88)*** -19.47 (4.39)*** 
HU -22.43 (8.97)** -16.07 (11.80) -6.36 (5.65)  -32.53 (6.75)*** -20.07 (4.84)*** -18.72 (4.35)*** 
LT 25.29 (10.11)** 31.03 (13.30)** -5.74 (6.37)  -10.87 (7.61) -20.54 (5.45)*** -14.01 (4.91)*** 
LV 6.42 (10.12) 9.58 (13.32) -3.17 (6.37)  -3.24 (7.62) 1.97 (5.46) -8.37 (4.91) 
PL -1.29 (8.51) -0.25 (11.19) -1.05 (5.36)  -18.17 (6.40)** -8.68 (4.59)* -7.19 (4.13)* 
SI 0.17 (14.66) -4.38 (19.29) 4.55 (9.23)  -5.87 (11.03) 5.94 (7.91) -8.39 (7.11) 
SK 11.72 (9.84) 18.78 (12.95) -7.08 (6.20)  -12.32 (7.41) -6.66 (5.31) -5.16 (4.78) 
R2 0.66 0.51 0.24  0.64 0.73 0.66 
Adj. R2 0.51 0.29 -0.11  0.48 0.61 0.51 
Num. obs. 30 30 30  30 30 30 
Notes: BG is the reference category for countries, ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1 
Party novelty and partial novelty 
We now turn to candidate novelty in individual parties. How many of the parties are 
genuinely new and how many qualify as old in terms of their candidate lists? Looking at all 
parties, regardless of their levels of support (the black area on Figure 11), highly new parties 
dominate – new candidates form a majority in most parties that contest elections. Levels of 
novelty decrease when we move to progressively more popular parties. The bulk of parties 
that entered the parliament – roughly corresponding to the two lightest areas on Figure 11 – 
have a weighted novelty score clearly below 0.50. Among the parties that won more than 10 
percent of votes, those with WCN between 0.1 and 0.4 dominate. However, novelty does not 
entirely tail off among large parties. A considerable portion of parties with more than 10 
percent of the vote had more than 50 percent of new top candidates. Most intriguingly, 
there is another peak in the distribution at close to perfect novelty – that stands for 
genuinely new parties (Sikk and Köker 2015a; Sikk 2005). Also notably, a slightly smaller 
number of parties still falls between the two peaks. The parties with WCN between 0.5 and 
0.8 are particularly problematic for the purposes of volatility calculation as they are partially 
novel parties (see Sikk and Köker 2015a).  
                                                 
19 Corruption is another potentially important determinant – see our study with a somewhat different purpose 
and focus (Sikk and Köker 2015b). 
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Figure 11 Candidate novelty by vote% 
 
Note: Kernel density curves: black (all parties), dark red (V>1%), red (V>2.5%), orange (V>5%), yellow (V>10%). 
What are these highly successful parties with high levels of candidate novelty? Table 3 shows 
that all countries except for Hungary have seen breakthroughs of such genuinely new parties 
with more than 10 percent of votes and WCN above 0.8. At the bottom of the table we find 
mostly electoral coalitions (or mergers, in italics) that are somewhat novel by the virtue of 
having a new organization, but are often below the mean level of candidate novelty in our 
dataset (0.57 percent; indicated by the dashed line). Some of the others are post-electoral 
coalition electons; notable, fewer are splinters from a previously existing proper party. Finally, 
a number of parties with candidate novelty between 0.4 and 0.80 are not straightforward 
cases of coalitions, splinters or mergers. These are mostly formations with novel names and 
organizational structures, yet include a significant number of candidate at the top of their 
lists who had been running for other parties previously. In many cases, they have a complex 
organizational history and can only meaningfully classified as partially novel parties. In such 
cases, the line between continuations and new parties is very blurred. However, as some of 
the parties won elections, coding them as new or old parties can decisively influence 
volatility scores. Indeed, we elsewhere we have called for a more nuanced approach to 
volatility, that incorporates candidate novelty measured on an interval scale (Sikk and Köker 
2015a). 
Interestingly, sometimes parties which do not undergo any significant organizational (or 
name) changes, see high levels of candidate turnover (see Table 4). Whether such parties 
should be seen as genuine continuations is debatable. 
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Table 3 Candidate novelty in new parties (following party codes in Manifesto Data Collection) 
party country year WCN Vote % 
JL New Era LV 2002 0.965 24.0 
RP Palikot's Movement PL 2011 0.960 10.0 
Smer Direction-Social Democracy SK 2002 0.953 13.5 
SaS Freedom and Solidarity SK 2010 0.947 12.1 
SMC Party of Miro Cerar SI 2014 0.936 34.5 
GERB Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria BG 2009 0.928 39.7 
NDSV National Movement Simeon the Second BG 2001 0.924 42.7 
DP Labour Party LT 2004 0.914 28.4 
TPP National Resurrection Party LT 2008 0.911 15.1 
RP Union for the Republic EE 2003 0.886 24.6 
SRP Self-Defence of the Polish Republic PL 2001 0.856 10.2 
VV Public Affairs CZ 2010 0.824 10.9 
NS New Union (Social Liberals) LT 2000 0.814 19.6 
Jobbik Movement for a Better Hungary HU 2010 0.741 16.7 
TP People’s Party LV 1998 0.716 21.3 
PO Civic Platform PL 2001 0.698 12.7 
LLS Lithuanian Liberal Union LT 2000 0.688 17.3 
PS Zoran Jankovic's List - Positive Slovenia SI 2011 0.687 28.5 
TOP09 Tradition, Responsibility, Prosperity 09 CZ 2010 0.626 16.7 
KMÜ Coalition Party and Rural Union EE 1995 0.583 32.2 
PCTVL For Human Rights in a United Latvia LV 2002 0.547 19.1 
ODS United Democratic Forces BG 1997 0.500 52.2 
KzB Coalition for Bulgaria BG 2001 0.492 17.1 
LSDA Latvian Social Democratic Alliance LV 1998 0.470 12.9 
ER Estonian Reform Party EE 1995 0.461 16.2 
UTT Coalition of Rolandas Paksas ‘For Order and Justice' LT 2004 0.442 11.4 
DL Democratic Left BG 1997 0.430 22.1 
SDKÚ Slovak Democratic and Christian Union SK 2002 0.424 15.1 
BSP Bulgarian Socialist Party BG 2013 0.423 26.6 
ERL Estonian People’s Union EE 2003 0.412 13.0 
AWS Electoral Action ‘Solidarity' PL 1997 0.399 33.8 
SDL' Party of the Democratic Left SK 1998 0.397 14.7 
SNS Slovak National Party SK 2006 0.373 11.7 
IL Pro Patria Union EE 1999 0.333 16.1 
SLD-UP Coalition of the Democratic Left Alliance and the Union of Labour PL 2001 0.308 41.0 
FiDeSz-MPSz-KDNP Alliance HU 2006 0.302 42.5 
LiD Left and Democrats PL 2007 0.291 13.2 
SLD Democratic Left Alliance PL 2005 0.245 11.3 
DP Labour Party LT 2012 0.233 20.7 
UW Freedom Union PL 1997 0.219 13.4 
K Estonian Center Party EE 1995 0.201 14.2 
KDU-CSL Coalition of KDU-ČSL and US-DEU   CZ 2002 0.178 14.3 
SDK Slovak Democratic Coalition SK 1998 0.170 26.3 
UdL Working for Lithuania LT 2004 0.158 20.6 
TB-LNNK For Fatherland and Freedom National Independence Movement LV 1998 0.147 14.7 
TS-LKD Homeland Union - Lithuanian Christian Democrats LT 2008 0.144 19.7 
BSDK A. Brazauskas Social Democratic Coalition LT 2000 0.137 31.1 
LSDP Lithuanian Social Democratic Party LT 2008 0.129 11.7 
PTT Order and Justice LT 2008 0.123 12.7 
FiDeSz-MPP-MDF FiDeSz-MPP-MDF-Alliance HU 2002 0.060 41.1 
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Table 4 Old parties with candidate novelty over 0.5 
party country year WCN Vote % 
FKgP Independent Smallholders’ Party HU 1994 0.754 8.8 
DPS Movement for Rights and Freedom BG 2001 0.695 7.5 
Desus Democratic Party of Pensioners of Slovenia SI 2011 0.670 7.0 
ATAKA National Union Attack BG 2009 0.667 9.4 
PCTVL For Human Rights in a United Latvia LV 2006 0.598 6.0 
SRP Self-Defence of the Polish Republic PL 2005 0.583 11.4 
SNS - Slovenian People's Party and Youth Party of 
Slovenia  SI 2008 0.571 5.4 
LDS - Liberal Democracy of Slovenia  SI 2008 0.562 5.2 
DPS Movement for Rights and Freedom BG 2005 0.551 12.8 
Desus Democratic Party of Pensioners of Slovenia SI 2008 0.540 7.4 
HZD - Movement for a Democratic Slovakia SK 2002 0.519 19.5 
Note: as defined in Manifesto Research Group dataset 
Discussion and conclusion 
This paper has analysed candidate novelty in Central and Eastern Europe. We saw at best a 
limited overall trend towards stabilization of candidate lists, with candidate novelty 
decreasing in some countries more consistently than in others. The trends in candidate 
novelty generally correspond to what we know about dynamics of individual party systems. 
In particular, we see a very clear pattern of disrupted consolidation in the Czech Republic 
and Hungary, and steady consolidation in Estonia. The index of weighted candidate novelty 
is correlated to volatility scores as calculated by Powell & Tucker (2014), but the relationship 
is less than perfect. Indeed, looking at candidate novelty scores has indicated issues with the 
coding of party entry and exit. However, we argue more fundamentally that electoral 
volatility scores that rely on dichotomous coding of new and old parties, splits, mergers and 
electoral coalitions are bound to be misleading due to prominent partially novel parties in 
terms of their candidates (but potentially also other aspects). Such electons – to use a joint 
term for parties and coalitions – are pervasive in CEE, but they are also present elsewhere – 
e.g. Israel (Barnea and Rahat 2011) and Denmark (Sikk and Köker 2015a). We do not argue 
that electoral landscape stays intact if, say, two parties form an electoral coalition that 
exclusively draws on candidates of these parties (and hence has zero novelty). Certainly, 
other dimensions of electon change need to be accounted for. However, we do argue that 
such a coalition is not a totally new electon and should contribute less to electoral volatility 
scores than a genuinely new party with only new candidates. 
More fundamentally, we also call for a refined conceptualization of what a political party is. 
With simplification, we can distinguish between two different approaches to political parties. 
Some of the literature analyses political parties from the perspective of political 
organizations with internal structures, members, leaders, political ideas etc. Other literature 
mostly sees political parties through a prism of elections. Much of the literature on party 
system change and new political parties belongs to the second type, but sometimes 
struggles with non-partisan political actors (such as electoral coalitions) and partially new 
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parties.20 We believe that focussing on electoral candidates does not only provide a wealth 
of highly nuanced data to contribute to a continuous scale of party change, but also offers 
an excellent link between the two approaches. On the one hand, candidates are the apex of 
party organization and selected using organizational procedures. On the other hand, they 
are intrinsically linked to elections. The analysis of candidate turnover also offers to our 
knowledge the best way to conceptualize political parties as a fluid phenomenon that are 
seldom perfectly new or old, but can rejuvenate or stagnate to different extent, merge and 
split, and form and disband temporary alliances. Such party fluidity is particularly common in 
CEE, but can also be found in at least some Western European countries. As we have shown 
above and as can be seen by looking at candidate novelty and dropout in Appendices, 
candidate turnover captures the extent of party change rather well.  
Even more fundamentally, we would even suggest that parties as such have received 
excessive attention in studies on electoral and political change. Much of political science 
literature assumes almost teleological development of party systems and individual parties 
towards a specific (West European-like) form of consolidation (the alternative being bust), 
where parties are reasonably stable and new parties seldom surface. It is also often an 
implicit or explicit assumption that it would be in the interest of many or most socio-
economic and political actors. Given the amount of transformation that political parties can 
undergo, it might be more instructive to think about them as useful "vessels" for various 
social actors, such as political entrepreneurs who set up parties, interests, elites, voters or 
even ideology. Perhaps these actors could be seen as "selfish genes"21 that use political 
parties as carriers in their interest. It is conceivable that political parties (or any organizations) 
hardly have any interests of their own, apart from those of its leaders, members, supporters 
and voters. If so, party transformations, rather than stability at all costs, may serve the 
interests of these constituencies; in some situations, continued party success or even survival 
might be less than optimal; party "death" is certainly much less regrettable than that of an 
individual.22 We suggest that electoral candidates are one possible way to look beneath the 
surface of political parties – they can be conceptualized as a sort of "political DNA" or a 
genetic marker that operates inside political parties and makes them what they are. 
The fact that such transformations are – or, perhaps more accurately, "were" – rare in 
Western Europe is beside the point. Lack of dynamism in West European party systems was 
the result of particular historical circumstances until a couple of decades ago. Today, there 
are signs of increasing dynamism in many West European parties and party systems. 
Evolution of political parties in CEE has been conditioned by other factors and has taken a 
                                                 
20 The "parties as organizations" school provides a much better perspective on the latter but is not particularly 
concerned with the former. 
21 To borrow a notion from Richard Dawkins, 2006 who has suggested that evolution ultimately serves the 
"interests" of genes rather than individuals or organisms. 
22 "Party death" and perhaps also "birth" are somewhat unfortunate anthropomorphic terms that we suggest be 
avoided. They both proscribe to political parties human instincts, such as survival. Under certain circumstances, 
the dissolution of a party may well serve the interests of the "genes". 
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different path, where the "political genes"– or the relatively more dominant ones – can be 
better served by some fluidity and transformation. There are, of course, strong reasons to 
believe that democratic stability is better served by strongly consolidated parties and party 
systems, but this option might as well be off the menu in contemporary societies.  
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Appendix 1. Weighted novelty among individual parties (V > 10%) 
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Appendix 2. Weighted dropout among individual parties (V > 10%) 
Note: horizontal scales refer to years when the candidates were dropped. Font size (corresponds to V% and 
party weights) are based on their electoral performance in previous election. 
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